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COMMENTS
TRIAL DE NOVO UNDER THE FOOD STAMP ACT OF
1964; THE PERMISSIBLE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INTRUSION
Pursuant to the administrative scheme' of the Food Stamp Act of
1964 ,' James Cross, after admitting he violated3 provisions of the fed-
eral food stamp program, 4 was disqualified from the program for one
year. In the District Court for the District of South Carolina, Cross
sought de novo review of the sanction imposed. The court characterized
the sanction as "harsh," but declined to review its validity." On appeal,
in Cross v. United States6 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
remanded the case and permitted the district court to modify the sen-
tence upon finding arbitrary or capricious action by the agency. This
comment focuses upon the propriety of this decision.7
Specifically, Cross involved review of administrative action under sec-
tion 2020 of the Food Stamp Act of 1964,8 which authorizes the sus-
pension of trading privileges of stores found in violation of the Act or
programs promulgated thereunder. While there was some uncertainty
1. 7 C.F.R. §§ 270.1-70.5 (1975).
2. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-25 (1970).
3. Under the food stamp program, stamps may be accepted only for certain items,
7 C.F.R. § 272.2(b) (1975), and no more than 49 cents may be exchanged for stamps
in any one transaction. Id. § 272.2(e). Cross admitted that his grocery store, on certain
occasions, had violated both of these regulations. In mitigation, he stated that his clerk,
a man with a "drinking problem," was the offender, and that, upon discovery of the
clerk's conduct, Cross "discharged him. Cross v. United States, 512 F.2d 1212, 1215 (4th
Cir. 1975).
4. See notes 13-14 infra & accompanying text.
5. Cross v. United States, 512 F.2d 1212, 1216 (4th Cir. 1975).
6. Id.
7. For an analysis of judicial review of administrative action in general, see Butz V.
Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182 (1973); Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355
U.S. 411 (1958) (per curiam); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952); Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608
(1946); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Switchmen's Union v.
National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United
States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); 4 K. DAvis, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW §§ 28.01-30.14 (1958 & 1970 Supp.) [hereinafter cited as K. DAvis]; L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINIsTR--TIVE ACTION (abr. student ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited
as L. JAFFE]; Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review, 71 HARv. L. REV. 401, 769 (1958).
8. 7 U.S.C. § 2020 (1970).
[1611
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:161
in cases arising under the Act as to whether administrative sanctions
could be brought under judicial scrutiny at all (where the administrative
determination that the participant had violated the Act was found to be
valid)," decisions prior to Cross uniformly held that district courts had
no power to modify the suspension imposed. 10 In deciding to the con-
trary, Cross has authorized "an impermissible intrusion into the admin-
istrative domain." '"
ADJUDICATORY PROCEDURE UNDER THE FOOD STAMP ACT
The Food Stamp Act of 1964, administered on the national level by
the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) of the United States Department
of Agriculture,"Z establishes a program whereby low income consumers
can increase their food purchasing power within the private retail
market.'3 The operation of the program is relatively simple. A qualified
recipient buys stamps which have a face value higher than their pur-
chase price, exchangeable at face value for food at an authorized retail
9. Compare Welch v. United States, 464 F.2d 682, 684 (4th Cir. 1972) and Miller
v. United States Dep't of Agr., F. & N. Serv., 345 F. Supp. 1131, 1132 (W.D. Pa. 1972)
with Shurkin v. United States, 32 Ad. L.2d 120 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) and Great
At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (by implica-
tion).
10. See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 464 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1972) (district court may
not reduce an administrative sanction for admitted violations of the Food Stamp Act);
Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878 (1972); Save
More of Gary, Inc. v. United States, 442 F.2d 36 (7th Cir.) (by implication), petition
for cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 987 (1971); Marcus v. United States Dep't of Agr., F. & N.
Serv., 364 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Miller v. United States Dep't of Agr., F. & N.
Serv., 345 F. Supp. 1131 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (despite court's admission that administrative
sanction was oppressive, the court held the district court powerless to modify the
period of disqualification); Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. United States, 342 F. Supp.
492 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Farmingdale Supermarket, Inc. v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 534
(D.N.J. 1971) (by implication); Marbro Foods, Inc. v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 754
(N.D. Ill. 1968) (semble); cf. American Nat'l Foods, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agr.,
381 F. Supp. 1021 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Shurkin v. United States, 32 Ad. L.2d 120 (4th
Cir. 1973) (per curiam). But cf. J.C.B. Super Markets, Inc. v. United States, 57 F.R.D.
500 (W.D.N.Y. 1972) (finding division on issue, citing Welch v. United States, supra,
and dissent in Martin v. United States, supra).
11. Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 188 (1973). In deciding that
the district court may modify a sanction imposed by the Secretary (acting through his
designates), the court overruled Welch v. United States, 464 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1972).
512 F.2d at 1215.
12. 7 C.F.R. § 270.3(a) (1975). Locally, the food stamp program is administered
by the appropriate state agency. Id. § 270.3 (b).
13. 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1970). See also S. REP. No. 1124, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) in
1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3275.
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marketing concern which, in turn, redeems the stamps for cash.14 In
economically depressed areas, food stamp transactions are vital to food
retailing. Thus, when a store is found in violation of the terms of the
Act, even a month's suspension of its participation in the program could
bring severe financial hardship.15 The harsh effects consequent to a sus-
pension of trading privileges in food stamps necessitate a review pro-
cedure whereby the food merchant is afforded due process protection
from arbitrary action."'
Section 2020 of the Food Stamp Act authorizes the disqualification
of any food store found to be in violation of the provisions of the Act
or of the regulations promulgated thereunder.' i The factfinding and
adjudicatory procedures are left to the Secretary of Agriculture to
establish by regulation. The regulations issued pursuant to section 202018
allow disqualification "for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed 3
years, as FNS may determine ... ." 19 A firm considered for disqualifi-
cation "shall have full opportunity to submit to FNS information, ex-
planation, or evidence concerning any instances of noncompliance be-
fore a final determination is made by FNS as to the administrative action
to be taken." 20 Accordingly, notice is given to the firm, specifying the
alleged violations, and the firm is allowed to respond orally or in
writing." The allegations, response, and other available information are
considered by the Director, Food Stamp Division, who then makes his
determination.22 Such determination is "final and not subject to further
14. 7 U.S.C. § 2013(a) (1970).
15. See Cross v. United States, 512 F.2d 1212, 1217 (4th Cir. 1975).
16. While merchants have no "right" to participate in the food stamp program, it
is clear that such participation is a benefit to which constitutional due process rights
attach. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); 1 K. DAvis, supra note 7
5 7.12-13; Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 H.tRv. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
17. The regulations are set out at 7 C.F.R. §§ 270.1-274.14 (1975). Typically, when
FNS suspects a store of violating the Act, it will send "shoppers" to the store who will
attempt to pay for ineligible goods (alcoholic beverages, tobacco, imported food and
nonfood products) with food stamps. Suspensions usually have been imposed only after
repeated violations. See, e.g., Cross v. United States, 512 F.2d 1212. 1215 (4th Cir. 1975);
Welch v. United States, 464 F.2d 682, 683 (4th Cir. 1972); Save More of Gary, Inc. v.
United States, 442 F.2d 36, 38 (7th Cir. 1971); i'arbro Foods, Inc. v. United States, 293
F. Supp. 754, 755 (N.D. III. 1968).
18. 7 C.F.R. §§ 272.6-272.8 (1975).
19. Id. 5 272.6(a).
20. Id. § 272.6(b).
21. Id.
22. Id. § 272.6(c). By the terms of sections 272.6 (b) and (c), the firm is given
"full opportunity" to meet the allegations contained in a "letter of changes," but in
19751
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administrative or judicial review," absent a timely request for such re-
view.
Administrative review of the Director's decision lies with the Food
Stamp Review Officer;24 imposition of a penalty is stayed pending his
disposition.' Again the firm is allowed to submit information relating
to the alleged violation,26 and the Director is required to "submit, in
writing, all information which was the basis for the administrative
action" 27 previously taken. The Review Officer makes his decision after
considering the information supplied by the Director, the firm, and "any
other person having relevant information." 28 Where a suspension is
involved, the Review Officer "shall sustain the action under review or
specify a shorter period of disqualification, direct that an official warn-
ing letter be issued to the firm in lieu of any period of disqualification,
or direct that no administrative action be taken in the case." 29 Op-
portunity thereby is given the firm to contest the suspension period as
well as the fact of violation.
After the Review Officer renders his final decision, the firm may seek
review in the district court by filing suit against the United States under
section 2022, and may obtain a stay of the suspension upon application
and "a showing of irreparable injury . . . ." 30 It is at this point that the
problem of reviewability of an administrative sanction arises. Section
2022, in pertinent part, provides: "The suit in the United States district
court... shall be a trial de novo by the court in which the court shall
determine the validity of the questioned administrative action in issue." 31
The question presented is twofold: Does review extend to the sanction
imposed if that sanction is within the lawful limits prescribed by the
Secretary? If the scope of review does encompass the sanction, does
the district court have the power to modify that penalty; in other words,
making his determination, the Director, Food Stamp Division, may consider not only
the letter and the response, but also "such other information as may be available to
FNS .. ." Id. Presumably the Director could act on information which would not be
disclosed to the firm.
23. Id. § 272.6(d). The preclusion of judicial review at this stage is authorized by
section 2022.
24. 7 C.F.R. § 272.8 (1975).
25. Id. § 272.8(a), 273.7 (a).
26. Id. § 273.6(b).
27. Id. § 273.7 (d).
28. Id. § 273.8(a).
29. Id. § 273.8(c).
30. 7 U.S.C. § 2022 (1970).
31. id. § 2022(c).
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can the court reduce the period of suspension, or must it remand the
case to the agency for reconsideration?
THE ISSUE OF PENALTY REVIEW: PRE-CROSS CASE LAW
The issue of penalty review was raised first in Aarbro Foods, Inc. v.
United States. 2 In Marbro the district court indicated that section 2022
was directed toward evidentiary issues, and not at the administrative
choice of remedy: "The scope of judicial review for administrative de-
cisions made under the Food Stamp Program was limited by Congress
to a determination as to whether the agency's decision is valid.... Find-
ings of an administrative agency are to be accepted upon judicial review
unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence." 13 The court ap-
parently severed the penalty determination from the "agency decision,"
by restricting its findings to validity of the factual determination that
the store was in violation of the Act. 4 Impliedly, the sanction imposed
did not fall within the scope of judicial review.
Marbro was followed by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Save More of Gary, Inc. v. United States3 5 though upon a slightly
different rationale. The court in Save More apparently accepted plain-
tiff's assumption that the penalty was an integral part of the "agency
decision," but upheld the district court's refusal to review the sanction
on the ground that the sanction imposed did not impair the "validity" of
the administrative action. It is not clear whether the court felt that
the validity of the action hinged upon a sanction which fell within law-
ful limits, or, alternatively, that a penalty beyond those limits could not
affect the validity of the action.
The first challenge to decisions sheltering suspensions from judicial
review came in Sixth Circuit Judge Edwards' dissent to Martin v. United
States.37 Judge Edwards stated: "Under any normal construction of
legal language, [trial de novo] gives to the reviewing court all the power
that the court or agency below possessed, including the power to enter
32. 293 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. III. 1968).
33. Id. at 755.
34. At least a cursory judicial glance at the terms of the penalty was implicit in the
court's observation that the suspension was "for a reasonable, definitely-stated period of
time," id., but the court's emphasis was clearly on the perceived evidentiary focus of
section 2022.
35. 442 F.2d 36 (7th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 987 (1971).
36. Id. at 39.
37. 459 F.2d 300, 302 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878 (1972).
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a disposition or judgment different from that originally entered." 38
The majority, however, read section 2022 as authorizing "a review only
on the merits of the case, and not on the period of disqualification." 3'
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit first faced the question
of sanction review in Welch v. United States.40  Welch adopted the
Marbro approach, finding that "[t] he reach of the judicial review ...
is not unqualified for the trial de novo is limited to a determination of
the validity of the administrative action, and the action which is subject
to judicial scrutiny is the action of disqualification." 41 However, Welch
did not go so far as to hold that the sanction was entirely beyond judicial
scrutiny: "If the violations are proven (or, as here, admitted), and if
the particular sanction is within the allowable range then the validity
of the administrative action has been established." 42 Thus, the court
implied that if a suspension in excess of three years was imposed, it would
not be allowed to stand. The court, however, did not state what action
would be appropriate should such a case arise.
Judge Butzner wrote a concurring opinion to Welch in which he
raised two significant objections to the majority's concept of review
under section 2022. 43 First, he found that "neither the Act nor the
regulation grants a merchant an evidentiary hearing in the administrative
process, either initially or on review. The only hearing allowed by the
Act is in the district court .... Adoption of the government's view [re-
view of disqualification only] will deprive the merchant of any hearing
-administrative or judicial-on the equally important question of how
long he should be disqualified." " Secondly, he delineated two elements
which he contended constituted the "action of disqualification": the
factual determination that a violation occurred, and the term of the sus-
pension to be imposed.45 Including the suspension as part of the "action
of disqualification" brought the penalty within the scope of judicial
38. Id. at 302.
39. Id. at 301. The court compared the penalty provisions of the Food Stamp Act
with those of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17a (1970), and the Perish-
able Agricultural Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 499a-499s (1970). Sanctions imposed
under the latter two Acts have been held unreviewable. See notes 106-18 infra & accom-
panying text.
40. 464 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1972).
41. Id. at 684.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 685.
44. Id.
45. Id., citing Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970).
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review as formulated by the majority. Judge Butzner's opinion marked
the first objection on due process grounds to a limited scope of judicial
review under section 2022.
In Shurkin v. United States,46 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, apparently influenced by the reasoning of Judge Butzner's
opinion in Welch, wavered from the position that suspension of partici-
pation in the Food Stamp program is beyond judicial scrutiny. 7 In
Shurkin the court stated: "[W] hether or not a district court is em-
powered to reduce a penalty imposed by the Department of Agriculture
for violation of the Food Stamp Act, the penalty imposed in this case
was not an abuse of the Secretary's discretion, and the district court
should not have reduced the penalty." 48 The apparent discomfort with
the Welch holding led to a reconsideration of the issue of the scope of
judicial review under section 2022 in Cross.
CROSS V. UNITED STATES
The court in Cross based its change of position on the due process
issue raised by Judge Butzner in Welch.4 In examining the adjudicatory
proceeding conducted by the Director, Food Stamp Division, the ma-
jority found "no confrontation with accusers, no opportunity to cross-
examine and to test credibility, and no determination by an impartial
fact-finder." " Further, the court found that during the administrative
review conducted by the Food Stamp Review Officer, "the usual at-
tributes of a full 'hearing' are not present." 5' Holding that disqualifica-
tion from participation in the Food Stamp program constituted a depri-
vation of property demanding procedural due process under the Consti-
46. 32 Ad. L.2d 120 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
47. Instances of courts holding that such suspensions are unreviewable include: Amer-
ican Nat'l Foods, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agr., 381 F. Supp. 1021 (M.D. Tenn.
1974); Eckstut v. Hardin, 363 F. Supp. 701 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Marcus v. United States
Dep't of Agr., F. & N. Serv., 364 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Miller v. United States
Dep't of Agr., F. & N. Serv., 345 F. Supp. 1131 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Great At. & Pac. Tea
Co. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Farmingdale Supermarket, Inc.
v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 534 (D.N.J. 1971).
48. 32 Ad. L.2d at 120. Aside from the opinion, Judges Butzner and Craven contended
that the power to modify existed, but that it was improperly exercised in this case;
Judge Russell contended that there was no such power.
49. See note 44 supra & accompanying text.
50. 512 F.2d at 1216. The adjudicatory procedure is outlined at notes 20-23 supra &
accompanying text.
51. Id. at 1217. The review procedure is outlined at notes 24-29 supra & accompany-
ing text.
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tution of the United States,52 the court found the administrative pro-
cedure constitutionally infirm.53
No specific premise for penalty modification by the district court was
evidenced in the opinion. Apparently, the court assumed that the statu-
tory provision for a trial de novo conferred upon the district court
broad powers insofar as its disposition of the administrative action was
concerned, provided that a finding of abuse of discretion could be
made.54 Notably, the court held that a district court may reduce an ad-
ministratively imposed sanction even if the sanction lies within parameters
permitted by the Act and implementing regulations. "5 Yet the court
confusedly defined the role of the district court in modifying the penalty:
Even in those instances in which a district court may find on
de novo review that the Secretary erred in his determination of the
fact and gravity of the violations, it would be incumbent on the
district court to prescribe an alternate penalty, not on the basis of
what it, in the exercise of its judgment, would consider reasonable
and just, but within the guidelines set by the Secretary for the
enforcement of the Act. 6
In retrospect, it seems this premise required more justification than its
mere assertion.
Statutory Construction of Sections 2020 and2022
As previously noted, the treatment initially accorded sanction review
excluded the penalty from "administrative action," thereby removing it
from judicial scrutiny altogether.57  Courts often failed, however, to
draw a clear distinction between an absolute lack of jurisdiction to re-
view, and nonreviewability because the penalty was within lawful lim-
52. See note 87 hra & accompanying text.
53. The court devised a tripartite test to evaluate a sanction in the context of due
process: "Due process on the issue of sanction requires that the punishment follow
rationally from the facts, be authorized by the statute and regulations, and aim toward
fulfillment of the Act's purposes." 512 F.2d at 1217-18 (footnotes omitted).
54. Stated the court: "fOinly in those instances in which it may be fairly said on the
de novo record as a whole that the Secretary, acting through his designates, has abused
his discretion by acting arbitrarily or capriciously, would the district court be war-
ranted in exercising its authority to modify the penalty." Id. at 1218.
55. The court remanded the case to the district court to consider the propriety of a
one year sentence; the regulations permit disqualification not to exceed a period of
three years. 7 C.F.R. § 272.6(a) (1975).
56. 512 F.2d at 1218-19 (emphasis supplied).
57. See note 34 supra & accompanying text.
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its.58 Although the highly discretionary nature of the administrative
decision to suspend for a given period undoubtedly contributed to the
courts' reluctance to interfere, this concern should not have precluded
all investigation into the limits of section 2022.
A close reading of sections 2020 and 2022 for some indication of con-
gressional intent concerning the issue of judicial review yields incon-
clusive results.59 Section 2020 authorizes the disqualification of mer-
chants and provides that "[s] uch disqualification shall be for such period
of time as may be determined in accordance with regulations ..... I
Finally, "[t] he action of disqualification shall be subject to review. ... " 61
There is an apparent bifurcation of the decision to disqualify and the
determination of the period of suspension, with only the former "action"
subject to review.62 Yet, if Congress intended to place that action alone
within the scope of judicial scrutiny, it could have done so explicidy by
placing the review stipulation after the authorization to disqualify, and
before the provision for the period of suspension. Nor is section 2022
determinative, as no clear limitations are established in the provision for
"a trial de novo ... in which the court shall determine the validity of
58. See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 464 F.2d 682, 684 (4th Cir. 1972); Miller v.
United States Dep't of Agr., F. & N. Serv., 345 F. Supp. 1131, 1132 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
The limits of lawful agency action are defined not only by statute, but also by promul-
gated regulations. As the Cross opinion noted, "[an agency must follow its regulations
as well as statutory mandates." 512 F.2d at 1218 n.9, citing United States ex rel. Accardi
v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954); United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir.
1969). But see Berger, Do Regulations Really Bind Regulators?, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 137
(1967). Arguably, however,,an "unlawful" agency action is not "reviewable" since tech-
nically a suit challenging such action is not considered brought to "review." See Leedom
v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188 (1958).
59. The legislative history is no more satisfactory. See S. REP. No. 1124, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1964) in 1964 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 3275. Judge Butzner, in his
concurrence to Welch, submitted that since the report linked "administrative and judi-
cial review without suggesting that they differ in scope, [it] indicate[d] that they
[were] coextensive. Since the duration of disqualification may be reviewed adminis-
tratively [see note 29 siupra & accompanying text], the Report illustrate[d] that Con-
gress intended that the penalty may also be reviewed judicially." 464 F.2d at 686. The
report, in its explanation of the provisions, did note that section 13 of the Act (section
2022) "provide[d] for administrative and judicial review of . . . the disqualification of
... a participating concern . . . ." 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nvs at 3291. Reading
"disqualification" as including the period of suspension, however, is no more plausible
than limiting it solely to the decision to suspend. Hence, Judge Butzner's analysis seems
based more on his inclination toward a broad scope of review than upon a demonstration
of substantive congressional intent.
60. 7 U.S.C. § 2020 (1970) (emphasis supplied).
61. Id. (emphasis supplied).
62. This was the interpretation adopted in Welch. See notes 40-41 supra & accompany-
ing text.
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the questioned administrative action in issue." 63 It is difficult even to
carry the distinction drawn in section 2020 between the "action of dis-
qualification" and the determination of the period of suspension into
63. 7 U.S.C. 2022 (1970). There are three limiting terms in this phrase which have no
universal meaning: "trial de novo," "validity," (see notes 70 & 73 infra), and "adminis-
trative action." The majority in Cross found that "de novo" meant that "'the court
should make an independent determination of the issues,'" and that congressional use of
the term "authorized the reviewing court to engage in its own factfinding .... " 512
F.2d at 1216 n.4, quoting United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 368
(1967). Whether de novo review was limited solely to adjudication depended upon the
nature of the term "validity." Id. Judge Widener, concurring in Cross, found Judge
Edward's dissent to Martin, see notes 37-38 supra & accompanying text, persuasive, and
would have read "de novo" in its broadest sense. 512 F.2d at 1219-20. Both opinions
ascribed essentially the same liberal scope to "de novo," differing only as to whether
other terms in section 2022 imposed limits upon that scope.
Certainly there have been judicial pronouncements that justify the Cross interpreta-
tion of "de novo." See, e.g., Pittsburgh S.S. Co. v. Brown, 171 F.2d 175, 178 (7th Cir.
1948); Spano v. Western Fruit Growers, Inc., 83 F.2d 150, 152 (10th Cir. 1936); United
States v. Feller, 156 F. Supp. 107, 110 (D. Alas. 1957); American Fruit Growers, Inc. v.
S.T. Runzo & Col, 95 F. Supp. 842, 844 (W.D. Pa. 1951); Davis v. Brittain, 89 Ariz. 89,
-- , 358 P.2d 322, 326 (1960); Borreson v. Dep't of Public Welfare, 368 111. 425, 432, 14
N.E.2d 485, 488 (1938). And clearly "[the specific review provisions in 7 U.S.C. § 2022
... [give food distributors] a trial dc novo well beyond the scope of review available
under the general provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act." Peoples v. United
States Dep't of Agr., 427 F.2d 561, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (dictum). But "de novo" none-
theless has meant a restricted review in numerous contexts. "A trial de novo by a
reviewing court may mean (1) a retrial on the evidence presented and the record
made before the lower tribunal; or (2) a retrial in which the evidence is heard anew
by the appellate tribunal." In re Will of Collins, -- Del. -- , -- , 251 A.2d 345, 346
(1969). Accord, Denver & R.G.W.R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n 98 Utah 431, -- ,
100 P.2d 552, 554 (1940).
It seems settled that under section 2022 the reviewing court may consider evidence
dehors the administrative record, and may reach an independent factual determination
based upon a preponderance of the evidence. See J.C.B. Super Markets, Inc. v. United
States, 57 F.R.D. 500, 502-03 (W.D.N.Y. 1972); J.L. Saunders, Inc. v. United States, 52
F.R.D. 570, 573 (E.D. Va. 1971). But while statutory review provisions run "'a gamut
all the way from authorizing a judicial trial de novo . . . to denying all judicial review,'"
512 F.2d at 1220 (Judge Widener concurring), quoting Stark v. XVickard, 321 U.S. 288,
312-13 (1944) (Justice Frankfurter dissenting), there are constitutional objections to
unlimited judicial review, even under the de novo extreme. See notes 102-05 hfra &
accompanying text.
The express stipulation for de novo review is highly unusual. Only four federal
statutes currently in force, other than the Food Stamp Act, have been found which
include such a provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 43 (1970), formerly ch. 645, § 43, 62 Stat.
687 (1948) (may not be presently in force; see citation below of Endangered Species
Conservation Act of 1969); Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act § 819(a) (4), 30
U.S.C. § 801 (1970); Communications Act of 1934 § 504 (a), 47 U.S.C. § 35 (1970)
(proviso for trial de novo added by the Communications Act Amendments, 1960, Pub.
L. No. 86-752, § 7(b), 74 Star. 899); Export Administration Act of 1969 § 2405(f), 50
App. U.S.C. § 2401 (1970). With the exception of section 43 of title 18, U.S.C., the
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section 2022 since "administrative action" in section 2022 encompasses
denial of applications and denial of claims, in addition to disqualifications.
In the final analysis, as section 2022 is a general review provision, the
period of suspension might well fall within its ambit, assuming that the
legislative history of these statutes does not reveal any factors underlying the congres-
sional decision to provide for de novo review.
Section 43 (c) (1) of the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-135
9 1-12(f), 83 Stat. 275 codified at 16 U.S.C. § 668 cc-4 (1970) and 18 U.S.C. § 43(c) (1)
(1970) (16 U.S.C. § 668 cc-4 was repealed in 1973; 18 U.S.C. 43(c) (1) (1970) was left
intact), now Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 1540(a) (1). 16 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (1974),
provided for the assessment of fines up to $5000 for violations of the Act, and author-
ized the Secretary to bring suit in the district court for recovery of penalties. The court
was given "authority to review the violation and the assessment of the civil penalty de
novo." S. REP. No. 91-526, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1413, noted that the review provision as amended makes clear that the district court,
in a suit to collect a penalty, shall have the authority to review de novo both the vio-
lation and the assessment of the civil penalty. Spokesmen for the Department of the
Interior have expressed their belief that the courts have this authority already, and since
several persons have requested that this safeguard be made explicit, the committee de-
cided to write this provision into the bill. It should provide protection for private
persons who fear arbitrary action by the Secretary in a penalty proceeding. 1969
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1420. Section 1540(a) (1) of title 16, U.S.C.A., is essen-
tially the same as section 43 (c) (1) of the earlier enactment, except that the review pro-
vision now reads: "The court shall hear such action on the record made before the
Secretary and shall sustain his action if it is supported by substantial evidence on the
record considered as a whole." No reason for the change appears in the legislative
history.
Read together, the Endangered Species Acts of 1969 and 1973 raise three inferences
about judicial review de novo: (1) where Congress used the term "de novo," it intended
to confer upon the judiciary complete revisory powers; (2) where Congress intended
to bring the administrative sanction within the scope of judicial review, it did so ex-
pressly, as in section 43 (c) (1) of the 1969 act; and (3) for reasons known only to it,
in the administrative setting, Congress has found the traditional form and scope of
judicial review preferable to trial de novo. Given the evident legislative uncertainty as
to the limits and appropriateness of de novo review, an assumption that trial de novo
invariably encompasses the entire administrative action would be unwarranted. The
boundaries of the term are unclear, but that inherent limitations obtain seems beyond
question.
Finally, as to "administrative action," this may or may not include the determination
of the period of suspension. Assuming that the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 701-706 (1970), is an appropriate conceptual framework, the decision to suspend for
a particular period is within the realm of "administrative action." See 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)
(1970); id. § 551(13); id. § 551(10)(F). But section 2020 can be read to exclude the
period of suspension from the administrative action reviewable under Section 2022.
See note 62 supra & accompanying text. Although the operation of the Administrative
Procedure Act may be foreclosed by the specific review procedure of the Food Stamp
Act, cf. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955); Peoples v. United States Dep't of
Agr., 427 F.2d 561, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (dictum), the concept of administrative action
as encompassing the determination of the period of suspension is more consonant with
common knowledge and legislative understanding.
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explicit command of section 2020 (that "the action of disqualification
shall be subject to review . . . .") is not read as exclusive.
Because the regulations relating to disqualification establish a range of
lawful periods of suspension, 4 administrative action in choosing a par-
ticular period necessarily involves the exercise of discretion. This dis-
cretion, however, does not appear to be of a type which Professor Ken-
neth Culp Davis would classify as "committed." ', Davis states that "ad-
ministrative action is usually reviewable unless either (a) congressional
intent is discernible to make it unreviewable, or (b) the subject matter
is for some reason inappropriate for judicial consideration." 61 Since
"[t] he statutory requirement of de novo review is an unusual circum-
stance which calls for a much broader scope of judicial review of ad-
ministrative actions," 67 section 2022 does not meet the first Davis cri-
terion for nonreviewability. Further, because the imposition of a penalty
as a consequence of a violation of law involves matters of judgment
with which courts are particularly familiar, the second criterion also is
not met. 8
Agency Discretion: The "Arbitrary and Capricious" Test
If the choice of penalty by the agency is not "committed to agency
discretion," then it must be reviewable to some extent.69 Cross adopted
64. 7 C.F.R. § 272.6(a) (1975).
65. Though the Administrative Procedure Act may not be applicable to action taken
under the Food Stamp Act, see note 63 supra, the "committed" theory is nonetheless
applicable, since review of actions taken under any statutory scheme which projects
the court into areas constitutionally reserved for the legislative or executive branches
necessarily will be precluded.
66. 4 K. DAvis, supra note 7, § 28.16, at 965.
67. Farmingdale Supermarket, Inc. v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 534, 536 (D.N.J.
1971).
68. Cf. Bamberger v. Clark, 390 F.2d 485, 488 (D.C. Cit. 1968). It does not neces-
sarily follow, however, that such action is reviewable simply because, in this context,
courts are as competent as agencies. Remission of penalties is excluded from review;
courts consistently have held this action to be "an act bf grace," unreviewable even for
an abuse of discretion. See United States v. One 1961 Cadillac, 337 F.2d 730 (6th Cir.
1964); United States v. One 1957 Buick Roadmaster, 167 F. Supp. 597 (E.D. Mich.
1958); 1 K. DAvis, supra note 7, § 4.05, at 253 (typical statute denies district courts the
power to review remissions). Where administrative policy is highly technical and is
effectuated through sanctions, courts may decline to review the penalties imposed, except
for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Nadiak v. CAB, 305 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1962).
69. There is a general presumption favoring judicial review of administrative actions.
See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Professor Jaffe has stated
that "there are very few discretions, however broad, substantially affecting the person
or property of an individual which cannot at some point come under judicial surveil-
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the prevailing "arbitrary and capricious" test as the threshold standard
of judicial review of sanctions imposed under section 2020.70 Although
Judge Russell, dissenting vigorously in Cross, found "no language in
§ 2022 to support that standard of review," 'I it seems unlikely that Con-
gress, in specifying de novo review, intended a more stringent standard
than that currently established under the Administrative Procedure Act.72
Thus, if one accepts the premise of reviewability, the Cross formulation
of review, limited by the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, is well
founded.73 But the court departed from traditional notions of this
lance." L. JAFFE, supra note 7, at 375 (emphasis deleted). Nonetheless, where there is
room for the exercise of agency discretion, courts traditionally have been reluctant to
interfere. See, e.g., Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 413 (1958); American
Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 112-113 (1946); FCC v. WOKO, Inc, 329 U.S.
223, 229 (1946); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941); Brennan v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 487 F.2d 438, 443 (8th Cir. 1973);
Wilson & Co. v. Benson, 286 F.2d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 1961); Daniels v. United States,
242 F.2d 39, 42 (7th Cir. 1957).
70. "To be 'valid,' a sanction must not be arbitrary and capricious . . . ." 512 F.2d at
1218. While "validity" is somewhat more satisfactory in defining a scope of review than
"trial de novo," see note 63 supra, it may be an ineffectual standard in the context of
the Food Stamp Act. See note 73 infra.
71. 512 F.2d at 1223 (footnote omitted).
72. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
73. At the very least, an administrative action must be the result of procedures which
conform to the statutory scheme and to the rules formulated by the agency. See
Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188-89 (1958); United States ex rel. Accardi v.
Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954). Therefore, if FNS imposed a suspension upon
a merchant without giving him an opportunity to submit information, or if it decreed
a suspension in excess of three years, such action would be unquestionably invalid. The
majority in Cross stated that "a sanction is arbitrary and capricious if it is unwarranted
in law or without justification in fact." 512 F.2d at 1218. Since regulations have "the
force and effect of law," Accardi v. Shaughnessy, supra, 347 U.S. at 265, a suspension
of less than three years, a fortiori, must be warranted in law. But see Espinoza v.
Farah Mfg. Co., 94 S. Ct. 334, 339 (1973). Whether a lawful suspension can be without
justification in fact presents an issue that is not resolved. Section 2020 authorizes dis-
qualification "on a finding . . . that such store or concern has violated any of the pro-
visions of this chapter, or of the regulations . . . ." There is no indication that the
agency is to scale the period of suspension to the gravity of the offense.
The problem was approached in Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182
(1973), wherein the Secretary of Agriculture, having found respondent in violation of
the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-231 (1970), chose to suspend
his registration for twenty days. Suspensions had been imposed previously only in cases
of "intentional and flagrant conduct," whereas respondents violations were "negligent
and careless." 411 U.S. at 185. For that reason, the court of appeals set aside the suspen-
sion. The Supreme Court reversed, stating that it could not "perceive any basis on
this record for a conclusion that the suspension of the respondent was so 'without
justification in fact' 'as .to constitute an abuse -of "[the Secretary's] discretion.'" Id. at
188 (brackets in original). The Packers Act, in permitting suspension "for a reasonable
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standard74 when it stated that the validity of a sanction falling within
lawful limits may be questioned. 75 The traditional position is illustrated
by Farmingdale Supermarket, Inc. v. United States,76 wherein the court,
confronting a factual situation similar to that presented in Cross, stated:
"The disqualification of the plaintiff is in accordance with regulations
specified period," 7 U.S.C. § 204 (1970), itself set up a standard by which to determine
whether the imposition of a given suspension was an abuse of discretion.
Although section 2020 does not contain a similar provision, the regulations adopted
pursuant to that section do provide that the disqualification be "for a reasonable period
of time, not to exceed three years . . . ." 7 C.F.R. § 272.6(d) (1975). As indicated in
Butz., however, current theory defining the respective roles of court and agency com-
pels the conclusion that this "reasonableness" be determined within the limits of admin-
istrative discretion, not in accordance with judicial concepts of fairness and justice.
See notes 78-84 infra & accompanying text.
Further, Cross did not go so far as to imply that the penalty had to be reasonable
within the purview of the district court, cf. Sunshine Dairy v. Peterson, 183 Ore. 305,
-, 193 P.2d 543, 560 (1948); rather, it held that only when the Secretary had "abused
his discretion by acting arbitrarily or capriciously," would the sanction be open to
review. 512 F.2d at 1218. In doing so, the court adopted the standard of section 10(e)
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). But in the numerous deci-
sions under that Act, there is nothing to support the proposition that the imposition of
an administrative sanction which falls within the express statutory or regulatory limits
can be an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 487 F.2d 438, 442-43 (8th Cir. 1973). See generally FTC v. Universal-Rundle
Corp., 387 U.S. 244, 250 (1967). It would seem that a suspension by FNS for less than
three years, imposed pursuant to a valid adjudication of violation, would be "an allow-
able judgment in its choice of the remedy." Jacob Siegal Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612
(1946). Accord, Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 188-89 (1973);
FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 473 (1952); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 726
(1948); G. H. Miller & Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d 286, 296 (7th Cir. 1958); Arrow
Metal Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 249 F.2d 83, 85 (3d Cir. 1957).
If the Cross court intended to subject extremely "harsh" administrative sanctions to
judicial scrutiny, the standard of "reasonableness" rather than "arbitrariness and capri-
ciousness" would have better served that purpose. Cf. Marlene's, Inc. v. FTC, 216 F.2d
556, 559 (7th Cir. 1954). Considering the results of applying an "abuse of discretion"
standard to sentencing in criminal cases, see notes 95, 119 infra, the Cross standard of
review may preclude examination of the sanction for excessive severity altogether.
74. There have been no decisions which would support the proposition that severity
alone can constitute arbitrary or capricious administrative action. Further, decisions in
the analogous criminal sentencing context indicate that the harshness of a sentence,
absent any other factors, cannot serve as a basis for finding abuse of discretion. See
notes 95, 119 infra. But see Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973) applying U.S.
Co.sr. amend. VIII. This does not protect from judicial scrutiny the application of a
sanction based upon grounds entirely unrelated to statutory purpose. See 1 K. DAVIS,
supra note 7, § 7.20, at 507. See also L. JAFFE, supra note 7, at 586.
75. 512 F.2d at 1218.
76. 336 F. Supp. 534 (D.N.J. 1971). Because Farmingdale was decided prior to
Welch, its reasoning probably survives the Cross decision overruling Welch. Because
Welch relied at least in part on Farmingdale, however, the authority of the earlier
decision may be undermined.
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and is valid as a matter of law." 7 The Cross inference, that a lawful
suspension imposed solely as a consequence of violation could be arbi-
trary and capricious, subverts the traditional deference courts accord
agencies in matters entrusted to administrative action by Congress.
Judicial deference to agency expertise is well-illustrated in Butz v.
Glover Livestock Commission Co.,78 a case arising under the Packers
and Stockyards Act.79 The court of appeals upheld the agency's finding
of a violation, but set aside a suspension imposed by the Secretary of
Agriculture because the violations were a result of negligence rather
than of wilfulness8s The Supreme Court reversed, stating:
The Secretary may suspend "for a reasonable specified period"
any registrant who has violated any provision of the Act. 7 U.S.C.
§ 204. Nothing whatever in that provision confines its application
to cases of "international and flagrant conduct" or denies its ap-
plication in cases of negligent or careless violations. Rather, the
breadth of the grant of authority to impose the sanction strongly
implies a congressional purpose to permit the Secretary to impose
it to deter repeated violations of the Act, whether intentional or
negligent.8
Cross interpreted Glover Livestock as merely a reiteration of the guiding
principle that the agency's choice of remedy should stand unless "un-
warranted in law or without justification in fact." 82 The language of
the Court in Glover Livestock, however, indicated a marked deference
to the Secretary's expertise in determining what measures were appro-
priate for enforcement of the Act." Though the Court did not reach
the question of whether a suspension which met the statutory standard
77. Id. at 536 (emphasis supplied).
78. 411 U.S. 182 (1973). See note 73 siupra.
79. 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-231 (1970).
80. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co. v. Hardin, 454 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1972).
81. 411 U.S. at 186-87.
82. 512 F.2d at 1218. For a discussion of how this principle functions in the context
of the Food Stamp Act see note 73 supra. Although the Cross opinion noted the spe-
cific holding of Glover Livestock, (uneven application of penalties does not render a
particular application unwarranted in law), the Cross court qualified that holding in
stating that "excessive variance, something more striking than 'mere unevenness,' would
be evidence of arbitrary or capricious action . . ." 512 F.2d at 1217 n.8. It is submitted
that Glover Livestock does not lend itself to such an interpretation, although Professor
Jaffe argues "that the concept of 'abuse of discretion' fshould] be conceived and used
with a breadth sufficient to enable the courts to condemn shocking disproportion." L.
JAFFE, suipra note 7, at 265.
83. But cf. United States v. J. B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974).
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of being "reasonable" and "specified" 84 could be at the same time 'arbi-
trary and capricious, its concern that the integrity of the policy decision
remain intact suggests a protective attitude that arguably would include
the choice of sanction to be imposed under the Food Stamp Act.
Procedural Due Process Precedent to Sanction
The primary argument for broad review advanced in Cross was that
since the administrative adjudicatory and review procedures did not
afford due process to merchants accused of violating the Act, it was
incumbent upon the court to evaluate the sanction "so as to preserve
the regulatory scheme from constitutional attack." 87, Although the ad-
mission by the 'nerchant of violation would ostensibly constitute a
waiver of due process rights, 6 the court required provision for full pro-
cedural due process at some point before deprivation occurred: "It is
the sanction imposed, once a violation of the Act or regulations has been
found, that constitutes the deprivation of property, not the mere fact
of violation, and the Constitution requires that due process be afforded
before that deprivation becomes effective." 87 Thus, the lack of pro-
cedural due process in the adjudicatory phase was held to taint the dis-
cretionary action taken pursuant to a finding of infraction.
Assuming arguendo that the procedures utilized by the Department
of Agriculture did not afford due process to the merchant, the majority's
assertion in Cross that there is a constitutional right to full procedural
due process before a suspension can be imposed even 'wbere the fact of
violation is not contested, is without basis in law. Judge Russell, in his
dissenting opinion in Cross, noted the "considerable difference . . . be-
tween the determination of a violation of law and the imposition of a sen-
tence or penalty after the fact of violation has been established." 88 He
continued: "The requirements of due process do not ... mandate that
the plaintiff be given a de novo hearing with rights of confrontation
and cross-examination when the sole issue is the validity of the sanction
imposed." s9 Procedural due process is intended to guarantee fairness
to the accused during the adjudicatory portion of the administrative ac-
tion brought against him.90 Its utility ceases once the action enters the
84. 7 U.S.C. § 204 (1970).
85. 512 F.2d at 1217 (footnote omitted).
86. See id. at 1222 (Russell, J. dissenting).
87. Id. at 1217.
88. 512 F.2d at 1222.
89. Id. at 1223.
90. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (evidentiary hearing required
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realm of discretion entrusted to an agency for the purpose of determining
the disposition best suited to advancement of the goals subserved by the
action.91
The role to be accorded due process with respect to sanctioning in an
administrative context is better defined by examination of the role ac-
corded due process in the post-adjudicatory stage of criminal actions. In
Williams v. New York,9 2 a criminal case, the Supreme Court held that
"[t]he due-process clause should not be treated as a device for freezing
the evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold of trial procedure." 93
And in several subsequent cases, the Court has noted the lack of limita-
tions upon the trial judge in sentencing. 4 The relatively unfettered dis-
cretion enjoyed by the sentencing judge where fundamental individual
rights are involved indicates that the exercise of similar discretion by an
agency is not violative of due process.95
Under the above analysis it seems apparent that the lack of opportun-
ity to confront and cross-examine one's accusers does not deny an ac-
cused procedural due process once he has admitted his guilt. In this
respect, the adjudicatory scheme of the Food Stamp Act is not consti-
by due process clause of the fourteenth amendment prior to termination of welfare bene-
fits) discussed at note 96 infra; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (Congress, with rare exceptions, pro-
vides those affected by agency action with procedural due process); Hornsby v. Allen,
326 F.2d 605, 608-09 (5th Cir. 1964). But see Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886-895 (1961) (summary exclusion of a civilian cook from a
naval gun factory without hearing or notice does not violate due process clause of the
fifth amendment).
91. This premise does not leave room for patently discriminatory conduct, see note
74 supra & accompanying text, but merely establishes the point at which the need for
administrative expediency may be balanced against the need to protect individual rights.
92. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
93. Id. at 251. This case is criticized by Professor Davis on the grounds that the
Court overstated the allowable discretion vested in the sentencing court, given the
right of allocution secured to a defendant prior to his sentencing. But Davis does not
contend, as the Cross majority apparently would, that a convicted defendant is entitled
to full procedural due process on issues regarding his sentence. See K. DAvIs, supra note
7, § 15.02, at 350-51. Under extraordinary conditions, however, due process (in the
sense of fundamental fairness rather than full procedural protection) may require the
setting aside of a sentence. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723-26" (1969).
94. See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970); North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969); Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585 (1959).
95. It has been noted that the severity of a sentence per se has not been found an
abuse of discretion. See note 74 supra. Traditionally, the discretion of the sentencing
judge in a criminal case has been deemed an improper subject for judicial review. Recent
commentators, however, have criticized this "rule of nonreview." See, e.g., Comment, The
Rule of Nonreview: A Critical Analysis of Appellate Scrutiny of Crininal Sentences,
17 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 184 (1975) f hereinafter cited as The Rule of Nonrevie¢w].
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tutionally infirm. Moreover, contrary to the position of the Cross ma-
jority, the scheme does provide an impartial decisionmaker. Under the
Food Stamp regulations, the evidence against a suspected offender is
gathered by the Officer-In-Charge of the FNS Field Office, and by
the Regional Office of the FNS, and forwarded to the Director of the
Food Stamp Division for disposition2"
Finally, in response to the Cross majority's contention that the ad-
judicatory procedure followed by FNS does not afford merchants full
procedural due process, it is submitted that any deficiencies inherent in
this process are cured by the trial de novo provision of section 2022.7
Once review is obtained in the district court, and no error in fact finding
is discovered, it seems evident that the merchant suffers no unfairness
96. 7 C.F.R. § 272.6 (1975). Impartial decisionmaking was recognized by the Supreme
Court in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), as being a vital element of procedural
due process. The scheme confronted by the Court in Goldberg stands in sharp con-
trast to that of FNS, for in Goldberg, caseworkers who gathered information upon
which termination of financial aid benefits was based, also assisted in deciding when
termination was appropriate. Id. at 271.
Goldberg is further distinguishable from Cross for the simple reason that therein plain-
tiff did not admit the validity of accusations subjecting him to termination of financial
aid. When such is the case, noted the Supreme Court, due process demands: "'the
opportunity to be heard .... at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,'" id.
at 267; "timely and adequate notice . . . and an effective opportunity to defend by con-
fronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting . . . arguments and evidence . . ."
id. at 267-68; "an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses." Id. at
269. "'[Tlhe evidence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the
individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue.'" Id. at 270. "[Tihe
decisionmaker's conclusion ... must rest solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced
at the hearing . . . [He] should state the reasons for his determination and indicate the
evidence he relied on . .. ." Id. at 271.
Arguably, Goldberg may be read as mandating that the Director, Food Stamp Divi-
sion, afford an accused merchant the opportunity to personally appear before him prior
to disposition. That no such opportunity was available in the Goldberg scheme formed
one basis of appellees' attack in Goldberg, id. at 259, but there was no specific indication
that the Court considered this deficiency, alone, as rising to the level of a constitutional
infirmity.
For a general treatment of due process in other areas see Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420,
442 (1960); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-68 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 1964).
97. Cross v. United States, 512 F.2d 1212, 1222 (4th Cir. 1975) (Russell, J., dissenting).
See generally Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971);
Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 18-30 (1899). It should be noted though that
unless certain requisites are met, see note 30 supra & accompanying text, the administra-
tive action will not be stayed pending judicial review. In some cases then, at least a
temporary deprivation of property will erroneously occur. It could perhaps be argued,
under the doctrine of Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), that this is a denial of due
process.
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because of any alleged deprivation of due process by the agency 8 A
fortiorari, the proposition that any lack of due process at the adjudicative
stage taints the sanction is unjustified.
THE PROPRIETY OF ALLOWING JUDICIAL
MODIFICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS
Although the appropriateness of extending review to the suspension
imposed pursuant to section 2020 is questionable, there exists at least a
prima facie argument in favor of broad review premised on the uncertain
limitations of a trial de novo.9 Under no construction of section 2022,
however, can the grant of power which permits the district court to
modify the administrative sanction be sustained. The Cross majority ap-
parently assumed that such power was contained within the provision
for a trial de novo, but the extraordinary nature of this judicial authority
requires a clearer declaration of congressional intent than was provided
by section 2022 or its history.Y° Although the modification of a dispo-
sition made by a lower court is encompassed by the concept of de novo
review, "[t]he technical rules derived from the interrelationship of ju-
dicial tribunals forming a hierarchical system are taken out of their en-
vironment when mechanically applied to determine the extent to which
congressional power, exercised through a delegated agency, can be con-
trolled within the limited scope of 'judicial power' conferred by Con-
gress under the Constitution." 101 And, as noted by Professor Davis,
"[t] he maximum limit on review is imposed for the purpose of prevent-
ing courts from engaging in nonjudicial activities. If the function per-
formed by an agency is 'administrative' or 'legislative,' and a federal
court is required to do all over again what the agency has done, the
system of review violates Article III of the Constitution." 102 At a mini-
mum, the trial de novo stipulation in section 2022 allows the court to re-
open completely the administrative factual adjudication, and to make an
independent finding based on all evidence presented before it, unconfined
98. The same result is obtained where, as in Cross, the merchant admits the alleged
violations. Judge Russell, dissenting in Cross, emphasized the undermining effect of a
conceded violation on the majority's due process theory. 512 F.2d at 1221-23.
99. See note 63 supra & accompanying text.
100. Cf. note 63 supra (discussion of Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969).
101. FCC v. Pottsville Bdcstg. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 141 (1940).
102. 4 K. DAvis, supra note 7 § 29.10, at 180. Cf. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S.
37, 54 (1948). See generally O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933);
Federal Radio Comm'n v. General Elec. Co. 281 U.S. 464, 468-69 (1930); Keller v.
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 443-44 (1923).
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by the administrative record'0 3 The reviewing court, upon finding an
arbitrary and capricious application, may examine even the sanction
imposed,0 but to allow the court to modify the penalty transfers to the
judge the entire function performed by the agency. The limitation on
this power fixed by Cross, that the alternate penalty be prescribed "not
on the basis of what it [the district court], in the exercise of its judg-
ment, would consider reasonable and just, but within the guidelines set
by the Secretary," 105 does not save the authorization from constitutional
objections.
Two statutory schemes similar in their penalty provisions to the Food
Stamp Act are the Commodity Exchange Act0 ; and the Perishable Agri-
cultural Commodities Act.07 Under the Commodity Exchange Act, the
Secretary of Agriculture may suspend for a maximum of six months the
license of any futures commission merchant or floor broker upon a find-
ing that such a person has violated the provisions of the Act. 08 Section
9 provides for review by the court of appeals which may "affirm, . . .
set aside, or modify'; the order of suspension.109 Despite this language,
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in G. H. Miller & Co. v.
United States,"0 denied a petition to set aside an order of suspension al-
leging that the penalty was too severe. The court first characterized the
agency's decision to impose a penalty within the limits of the statute as
"an allowable judgment in its choice of the remedy" "I and held that
"ordinarily the Court of Appeals has no right to change the penalty
because the agency might have imposed a different penalty." 112 Only
where "the remedy selected has no reasonable relation to the practice
found to exist" could the court interfere with the choice of sanction."'
Judge Finnegan, in concurrence, stated that "so long as the Secretary
makes findings of fact and they are based on evidence conforming to the
statutory standards and he acts intra vires the relevant acts of Congress
we cannot ... modify sanctions because we personally think them 'too
103. J.C.B. Super Markets, Inc. v. United States, 57 F.R.D. 500, 502-03 (W.D.N.Y.
1972). See J.L. Saunders, Inc. v. United States, 52 F.R.D. 570, 573 (E.D. Va. 1971).
104. See note 73 supra & accompanying text.
105. 512 F.2d at 1218-19.
106. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17b (1970).
107. Id. §§ 499a-499s.
108. Id. § 9.
109. Id.
110. 260 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1958).
111. Id. at 296, quoting Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612 (1946).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 296-97.
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harsh' [or] 'too severe.' To do otherwise ignores the expertise of the
Secretary .... ,, 114 G. H. Miller has not been questioned. 18
In Eastern Produce Co. v. Benson,".. the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that a license suspension imposed under the Perish-
able Agricultural Commodities Act was "well within the allowable
choice of remedy," and for that reason the court had "no right to change
the penalty because the agency might have imposed a different one."117
This self-imposed restriction was adhered to notwithstanding the lan-
guage of the Act's review section which provided that the suspension
should remain in force unless "suspended, modified, or set aside by a
court of competent jurisdiction." 118 In light of G. H. Miller and Benson,
wherein the courts confronted statutory language apparently allowing
judicial modification of administrative sanctions, the Cross inference of
amendatory power, where no such prima facie authorization exists, seems
unwarranted." 9
114. Id. at 300.
115. The case was cited with apparent approval in Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n
Co., 411 U.S. 182, 187 (1973).
116. 278 F.2d 606 (3d Cir. 1960).
117. Id. at 610.
118. 7 U.S.C. § 499j (1970).
119. The impropriety of judicial modification has been expressed by numerous courts
faced with allegedly "unfair" administrative sanctions. See, e.g., Butz v. Glover Live-
stock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 188-89 (1973); Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S.
411, 413 (1958); FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 21 (1952); FCC v. WOKO,
Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946); Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 487 F.2d 438, 442-43 (8th Cir. 1973); Great Western Food Distributors, Inc.
v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 484 (7th Cir. 1953). Contra, West N.Y. v. Bock, 38 N.J.
500, -- , 186 A.2d 97, 107 (1962). See generally Wilson & Co. v. Benson, 286 F.2d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 1961); Henry's Cafe, Inc. v. Board of Liquor Control, 170 Ohio St. 233,
-- , 163 N.E.2d 678, 681 (1959).
Judicial review of sentencing in criminal cases is analogous to review of administra-
tive actions insofar as modification is concerned. It has been demonstrated that there
is no requirement of full procedural due process in sentencing. See notes 92-95 supra
& accompanying text. Nor has any right of review generally been given to a convicted
defendant where the only issue is the severity of the sentence imposed. See Dorszynski
v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431, 440-41 (1974); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386,
393 (1958); United States ex rel. Perpiglia v. Rundle, 221 F. Supp. 1003, 1012 (E.D. Pa.
1963). Bit see Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), applying U.S. CONsr.
amend. VIII; Lieggi v. United States 1mm. and Nat. Serv. 389 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. I11.
1975). There are very limited circumstances in which appellate courts will vacate a
sentence and remand the case for resentencing. These instances were enumerated in
United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971): "[Clourts have approved of re-
manding for resentencing in cases where it appeared that a trial judge had improperly
considered certain factors in sentencing [citations], improperly relied upon certain
false information [citations], or grossly abused his discretion by failing to evaluate the
relevant information before him with due regard for the factors appropriate to sen-
1975]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Where a sanction is determined to be invalid by reason of either un-
lawful or patently discriminatory action, there must be a means by
which the court can prevent its effectuation. It is submitted that the
court should and does have the power to set aside such a penalty and to
remand the matter to the agency for reconsideration. 20 In another
case121 arising under a statutory scheme122 authorizing judicial modifica-
tion of an administrative order, 123 the Supreme Court found no "power to
exercise an essentially administrative function," 124 and enunciated "the
guiding principle ...that the function of the reviewing court ends
when an error of law is laid bare. At that point the matter once more
goes to the [agency] for reconsideration." 125 In another instance,'126
where the regulatory agency attempted to transfer to the judiciary the
responsibility of formulating a proper disposition upon a judicial finding
that the agency's order was defective, the Court held that "the Commis-
sion.., could not.., shift to the courts ... issues which Congress has
primarily entrusted to the Commission." 127 In section 2020, Congress
has entrusted the determination of the period of disqualification to the
Secretary of Agriculture. It is the duty, therefore, of the agency, and
not of the court, to impose a valid penalty. The power of the court to
intervene and prevent arbitrary and capricious action sufficiently pro-
tects the merchant; allowing the court to determine an "appropriate"
sanction would undermine the integrity of administrative competence. 28
Remand to the agency serves both interests.
tencing, (citations]." Id. at 970-71. But severity alone is not generally grounds for
relief. "The sentence being within the limits set by the statute, its severity would not
be grounds for relief here even on direct review of the conviction . . . " Townsend
v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948). See also United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809,
814 (2d Cir. 1970); Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 266 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United
States ex rel. Jackson v. Myers, 374 F.2d 707, 711 n.11 (3d Cit. 1967); United States
ex. rel. Burgess v. Rundle, 308 F. Supp. 1338, 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1970). But see The Rule of
Nonreview, supra note 96.
120. See generally Citizens Band of Potawatomi Indians v. United States, 391 F.2d
614, 624 (Ct. Cl. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1046 (1968); Nichols & Co. v. Secretary of
Agr., 131 F.2d 651 (1st Cir. 1942); Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1940).
121. FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17 (1952).
122. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828(c) (1970).
123. Id. § 825(1) (b).
124. 344 U.S. at 21.
125. Id. at 20.
126. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
127. Id. at 54.
128. As stated in Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 492
(S.D.N.Y. 1972),
[it would . . . be a mischievous practice for a District Court to engage
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Cross v. United States reaches an unsettling conclusion, and highlights
an area of administrative law that lacks definitive resolution. Aside from
the Food Stamp Act, there are few statutory schemes which authorize
a range of penalties which may be imposed at the administrative level
upon offenders. Consequently, court challenges to administrative action
based solely on the severity of the penalty chosen, where the penalty
fell clearly within the legal range, have been rare. The statutory re-
quirement of review de novo is even more uncommon, and the extent
of judicial intrusion allowed by such a provision has not been considered
extensively or determined with finality. Cross invites critical inquiry
into the role of the reviewing court when faced with a challenge to an
administratively imposed sanction. Affording review where the applica-
tion of the penalty is alleged to be arbitrary and capricious is sound. It
is maintained, however, that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit has erred in its application of constitutional due process theory to
suspensions imposed under the Food Stamp Act, in finding that a sus-
pension within unlawful limits can be arbitrary and capricious solely on
the ground that it is severe, and in determining that the district court
has the power to assume the administrative function of selecting a proper
period of disqualification.
in a competition with the administrative tribunal and its hearing officers in
the measurement of fair and reasonable periods of disqualification for plain,
inexcusable violations. It would lead to a form of chaos for the Courts to
compete with the agency representatives on the quantum of disqualification
to be meted out.
Id. at 493.
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